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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BEN MILLER· and
JOVALLE THOMAS,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.

Case No. 18085

LAWRENCE S. McMULLEN,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a tort action arising out of a semi-truck,
automobile accident which occurred on the 10th day of November,
1979., 4.1 miles West of Delta, in Millard County, State of Utah.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The matter was tried to a jury resulting in a special
verdict favoring plaintiffs.

The court entered judgment on the

verdict on June 24, 1981, in favor of plaintiff, Ben Miller, in
the amount of $67,650.00; and in favor of plaintiff, JoValle Thomas,
in the amount of $73,750.00.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a reversal of the judgment on the verdict.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 1 -

STATKMENT OF FACTS
Anthony M. Thurber, plaintiffs' counsel, in his opening
statement outlined the facts of the case.

The collision was between

a semi-truck driven in the eastbound lane by plaintiff, Ben Miller,
and a Subaru station wagon driven in the westbound lane by defendant,
Lawrence McMullen.
Delta, Utah.

The situs was a two-lane highway just West of

As Mr. Miller approached the intersection, the Subaru

signaled indicating a left turn.
bound lane of traffic.

The Subaru turned into the east-

Mr. Miller, in order to avoid the collision,

first applied his brakes but thereafter released them and turned
to the left.

When the vehicles were approximately 50 feet apart

Mr. McMullen, in the Subaru, suddenly turned to the right, returning
to the westbound lane of traffic.

The point of impact was in the

westbound, or Subaru's, lane of traffic.

R-36 to 39.

Mr. Thurber characterized Mr. Miller as being the only
real eye witness, or first hand eye witness to what had occurred.
Mr. Thurber informed the jury that the impact of the Subaru collapsed
the front bumper of the truck against the left front wheel, so that
the truck had no steering control after the front wheel contacted
the Subaru.
Ray H. Ivie, defendant's counsel, in his opening statement,
admitted that Lawrence McMullen could not remember anything that had
happened after he left Delta, Utah.

He contended that Tim Woodward,

a passenger in the McMullen vehicle, would testify that the McMullen
Subaru was going down the road at a normal speed, that the parties

- 2 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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had no intention of turning right or left, and all of a sudden
he looked up and right in front of the windshield was the semitruck.

He observed the driver of the Subaru crank it to the right.

It was Mr. ·Ivie's contention that the physical facts would demonstrate that the Subaru was parallel to the road on impact.

He in-

formed the jury that there were two independent witnesses traveling
in a car going in the same direction as the Subaru, and they did not
observe the Subaru in the eastbound lane of traffic.

Mr. Ivie in-

formed the jury that he did not believe that Mr. Miller's version
of what happened could be substantiated by the physical evidence.
Mr. Ivie informed the jury that he would call Newell Knight
as an expert who would testify that in his opinion the absence of
any fresh tire marks prior to impact indicated there was no sudden
turning by either vehicle, the Subaru being absolutely parallel with
the road at the point of impact at which time the semi-truck was at
a 14° angle to the road striking the midpost of the Subaru.

AS TO THE POLYGRAPH TEST:
In chambers, immediately prior to trial, Mr. Thurber
informed the court that he intended to introduce the results of a
polygraph test taken by Mr. Miller.

Mr. Ivie at that time informed

the court that if there was a polygraph test, that he would not agree
to the introduction of the results of such a test into evidence.

The

court, in chambers prior to trial, admonished Mr. Thurber not to
mention the polygraph test in his opening statement.
The first witness in the trial was plaintiff, Ben Miller.
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On cross-examination by defense counsel, Ray H. Ivie, the examination was not proceeding in the manner that Mr. Miller approved of.
The question was asked:

R-111, lines 15-16.

'~(By Mr~

Ivie) You said that you were inside of
the intersection. Where inside of the intersection
were you?"
To which Mr. Miller gave the following answer:

R-111, lines 17 to 19

"Mr. Ivie, I know what you are trying to do, and
I took a lie detector to verify what I'm testifying
is the truth."
Mr. Ivie called for a recess and made a motion for a mistrial.
At the recess the following dialogue took place:
R-112 line 9 to R-115 line 25
"THE COURT:
MR. IVIE:

St a t e your 1 aw ma tt er.
Yes, I ask for a mistrial at this time,

because he volunteered that he had taken a lie detector test, and
this is prejudicial.

This matter was brought up by the Court,

counsel, and there was not to be any mention of this until the
Court ruled on it.
THE COURT:

I think it's prejudicial error.
Well, for the record, it was brought up

before we came out, and it had to do with the opening statements
and I asked Mr. Thurber not to say anything about it in the opening
statements until such time -- and not to say anything about it in
the opening statement; that at an appropriate time we would decide
whether or not that evidence was admissible.

Now, if this is the

time to decide whether that kind of evidence is admissible, fine.
If it's not, then I'll rule upon your --

MR. IVIE:

I think this is the time, because I asked for
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a mistrial.

I don't lay in the bushes until I've lost it.

THE COURT:

All right, that's fine.

You've made a motion

for a mistrial upon the grounds that that kind of evidence is not
admissible· and, therefore, it would be prejudicial and to the extent
that it could not be cured by any kind of instructions by the Court.
jow, I'll hear, then, the positions with respect to the lie detector
evidence which may be proffered.
MR. THURBER:

Well, your Honor, it's true that Mr. Miller

did, before this lawsuit was ever started and at the insistence of
Mr. Ivie's client, submit to a polygraph examination.
THE COURT:

Was it at their insistence?

MR. THURBER:

Yes.

They refused to pay the property

damage until it was -THE COURT:
MR. IVIE:

And they had the lie detector test, then?
I don't know about that.

MR. THURBER:

Well, they had insisted on it before they

pay the property damage.
THE COURT:

But they insisted on you having it taken

before they would negotiate with you, is that right?
MR. THURBER:
MR. IVIE:

They wouldn't pay until they had.

That may be State Farm in Salt Lake, I had

nothing to do with that, and my client is a separate party.
THE COURT:

Now, Mr. Ivie, you are not representing to

this court that you represent this man and not State Farm?
MR. IVIE:
.:>ame here.

Oh, no.

I represent them, too.

They are the

But I had no knowledge of this being taken."
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"MR. IVIE:

Okay.

Who insisted on this in Salt Lake?

MR. THURBER:

Carolyn Jones?

THE WITNESS:

(Mr. Miller)

Carolyn Jones wouldn't say

anything about settling the property until we had a copy of the lie
detector test.
MR. IVIE:

Have you got a copy you could furnish me?

MR. THURBER:
MR. IVIE:

It should be in your file.

Never seen anything, of this date.

MR. THURBER:
THE COURT:
MR. IVIE:

They have it.

I'll be glad to get one for you.
You have access to the file.

Do you have a copy?

MR. THURBER:

I'm sure I do have in my file.

I'd have

to dig it out.
THE COURT:
MR. THURBER:

Who did the test?
A fellow named Steve Batley, who does the

examination for the Salt Lake Police Department.
THE COURT:
MR. THURBER:
THE COURT:

And the test was clean, not deceptive?
That's right.
And the only reason it was taken is because

the plaintiff in this case insisted upon that, when I say "the
plaintiff" I mean the insurance carrier for the plaintiff, insisted
that it be taken before negotiations would be had with regard to the
matter, is that so?
MR. THURBER:
McMullen.

The insurance carrier for the defendant

The only reason we had him submit to it.
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THE COURT:

I don't know.

I'm going to take this matter

under advisement, but I'm going to go on with the trial.

MR. IVIE :

Okay.

THE COURT:

And I will receive evidence with regard to it,

to the results of the test.
MR. IVIE:

Based upon their representation?

THE COURT:

MR. IVIE:

Yes.
Okay.

You are positive of that, now, you are

not taking his word on something?

me I

MR. THURBER:

No.

THE WITNESS:

(Mr. Miller)

I was in on it.
He was the one that told

was going to take the polygraph test; not me.

I hired him

to do the legal work."
Carolyn Jones, of State Farm, who was the person handling
the claim in question, testified that Ben Miller had suggested to
~er

her.

that he would take a lie detector test and furnish a copy to

R-268 to R-277.
Mr. Miller, when he was specifically asked about the test,

stated:
" ... It was you, (Mr. Thurber) , thought that I should
take it (lie detector test) and we should have it on
record for you ... I told her (Carolyn Jones) what I was
doing. And I said, 'We'd be most happy to give you a
copy of it'." R-277
And on cross examination of Mr. Miller in regards to the test,
Mr. Ivie asked:

R-280 line 20 to 22.

"Then it was at your suggestion that you had the
polygraph test taken, not at the request of anyone
from State Farm?"
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And to that Mr. Miller replied:

R-280 lines 23 to 25

"I never did say that it was requested.
I told her
that my attorney suggested that I take one, and she
says, 'I would like to have a copy of it'. Now,
that's the way
A.nd then Mr. Ivie asked:

R-280 lines 26-27

"Soi.twas at your attorney's suggestion that you
took it?"
To ~~ich Mr. Miller replied:

R-280, lines 28 to 30

"No. No.
It was my attorney's suggestion that I
took it; but when I told her about we were going
to take it she said, 'I would like to have a copy
of it'."
After Mr. Miller and Carolyn Jones had testified, Mr. Ivie stated
to the court:

R-281, lines 25 to 30 and R-282 lines 1 to 3

"Apparently, when you come down to the truth of
the matter, Tony thought it would be a good idea
to have Ben take a polygraph test, he took one
and furnished it to Carolyn Jones.
So far as the
test is concerned, it's simply self-serving.
If
it's favorable, he gives it to her.
If it's unfavorable, not. Now here's this man (Lawrence
McMullen) with this, and he's got a big stake in
this case here, his lips are sealed because he
has no memory of this. And to allow a -- he can't
testify as to what happened."

Mr. Thurber then stated his position to the court:

R-282 lines

9 to 12
"Well my position is simply this,
Ivie's entire thrust here is that
lying, just bald-face lying about
it's the best kind of evidence we
The court then stated:

your Honor: Mr.
Mr. Miller is
this thing, and
can have."

R-282 lines 13 to 15

"On the issue, Mr. Ivie, of whether or not this man
is telling the truth, what better evidence is there
available to anybody than a polygraph test?"
The court made its ruling.

R-283 line 20 to R-284 line 16
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"Okay.
I'm going to deny the mistrial.
I think it's
only fair that the Court announce that decision at
this time, and that gives the parties a right to or
the opportunity to take whatever action they want to
take, knowing what the result will be. And I do it on
the basis that where the purport of cross examination
of the plaintiff by the defendant is the assertion that
the plaintiff has lied on direct examination with respect
to the specifics as to how the accident occurred, it is
not grounds for a mistrial that the plaintiff spontaneously blurts out that he has previously taken a polygraph test with respect to those specific matters and
that he passed the test, if in fact it is true and if
the examiner or if -- strike that -- and if the test
results are available and proffered.
I think under the
circumstances and the circumstances, further, of this
case it would be error to refuse to allow the evidence
and the examiner's testimony, if it were offered. However, I will not, and this may be error also, but I
believe that the state of the art with respect to polygraph examinations is not such that even under the circumstances of this case I could admit the results of the test
without foundation.
Now that's where you are.
So don't
try to get the test result in before the Jury unless
you are prepared to bring the examiner, and we'll not
talk about the polygraph test on either side unless
the evidE~nce comes in to the Jury concerning it, unless
I admit evidence concerning it.
Okay?"
After the admonition of the court, as above set forth,
testimo·ny was taken of the first rebuttal witness, as follows:
R-472 line 24 to R-474 line 4
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. THURBER:

Q

What is your occupation -- I'm sorry.

Give us your name

first.
A

My name's Steven Taylor.

Q

It's not Thomas.

A

No, not Thomas.

Q

Where do you reside, Mr. Taylor?

A

In Salt Lake City.
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Q

What is your occupation or profession?

A

I'm a polygraph examiner.

Q

And will you tell us what that is?

A

A polygraph is a lie detector.

I administer lie detection

tests for various businesses, both private and public businesses.
Q

Now, what education and practical experience have you had

in that field?
A

In that field, in my background in education as a bachelors

degree at Utah State University and graduate work in exercise physioloi
MR. IVIE:

No

THE COURT:

'

sir ---

Now just a minute.

Approach the bench, please.

(Off the record.)
THE COURT:
and Gentlemen.

We are going to take a short recess, Ladies

A law question has arisen, I want to discuss this

matter with counsel in chambers.

And I'll ask them to come in.

(WHEREUPON, the Court and Counsel removed from the courtroom, where discussion was had off the record, and reconvened in open
court upon return to the courtroom at 1:26 o'clock p.m.)
THE COURT:

Ladies and Gentlemen, the Court has concluded

that as a law matter that, and after discussing with counsel what
the purpose of this testimony might be, that it is precluded by the
Rules of Civil Procedure; and, therefore, the Court declines, Mr.
Thurber, to permit the proffered testimony to approach the Jury.
MR. THURBER:
THE COURT:

Thank you.
Okay.

So you may step down.

- 10 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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MR. THURBER:

Thank you for corning."

Mr. Thurber then continued:

R-474 line 5 to 12

"Your Honor, my next witness would be another certified
polygraph 9perator, Steve Bartlett, who is out of the State and
not available.
In view of his absence, we'll call another rebuttal
witness.

We'll call Ben Miller.
THE COURT:

All right.

Now Counsel approach the bench.

(Off the record.)
Mr. Thurber then continued his rebuttal.

R-474 line 13 to 26

FURTHER DIRECT EXAf1INATION
BY MR. THURBER:
Q

Mr. Miller, now you were present during Major Knight's

testimony yesterday and today, were you not?
A

Yes , sir.

Q

And you saw his reconstruction of the attitudes, according

to his view of the two vehicles, at the time they came in contact,

did you not?

A

Yes, sir.

Q

Is that the way it was?

A

No, sir.

Q

Have you ever lied or will you ever lie to anyone about

No way.

what happened as relates to this accident?
A

No, sir."
The counsel, at the bench above referred to, disclosed

the fact that Mr. Steven Taylor had performed a polygraph test on
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Ben Miller some time after the trial commenced and before his
testimony was offered.
AS TO THE COURTtS JURY INSTRUCTION:
The court gave Jury Instruction No. 10, over defendant's
objection, to-wit:

R-471 lines 6 to 12.

"Defendant objects to the giving of Instruction
No. 10 for the reason that the Court has informed
the Jury of the effect of their verdict sof ar as
the comparative negligence law is concerned. And
although McGinn v. Utah Power case is a case that
arises out of Idaho, I still think that is the law
of the State of Utah. So for that reason I object
to it."
This objection was made before the instruction was given to the
JUry .

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT COMM:ITTED ERROR IN FAILING TO GRANT DEFENDANT McMULLEN'S
MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL WHEN PLAINTIFF, BEN MILLER, AS THE FIRST
WITNESS·, TESTIFIED THAT HE HAD TAKEN A LIE DETECTOR TEST THAT VERIFIED
WHAT HE WAS TESTIFYING TO WAS THE TRUTH.
The court committed error in failing to grant defendant
McMullen's motion for a mistrial when plaintiff, Ben Miller, as the
first witness, testified that he had taken a lie detector test that
verified what he was testifying ·to was the truth.
A 1980 Utah criminal case established the following rule
on the admission of polygraph examinations:
"Polygraph examinations may be admitted under binding
stipulation between parties, but even if there is
stipulation, admissibility must be premised upon proof
that examiner was qualified and that examination was
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conducted according to accepted principles, and
it does not necessarily follow that licensure of
examiner will by itself be sufficient to establish
examiner's qualifications." State of Utah v. Collins,
612 P.2d 775.
!he Court in the Collins case, supra, reviewed the development of the use of the polygraph and noted that there are some recent
decisions admitting polygraph examinations at least under certain
conditions.

The Court further noted the vast majority of courts

which have ruled on the issue, as to the admissibility of polygraph
tests, have held unstipulated polygraph examinations inadmissible.
The Court stated:
" ... it is impossible to address the issue of the
admissibility of polygraph results without an
adequate evidentiary record, including expert testimony which deals with such factors as the validity
of the underlying theory upon which polygraph examinations are based, the practical application of
those principles to the issue of detection of fabrication, the verifiability of polygraph test, and the
problem whether successful deception of the polygraph
can be accomplished." State vs Collins, supra, at 778.
A 1979 Utah case, State of Utah vs. Abel, 600 P.2d 994,
addressing itself to whether a stipulation was necessary as a
foundation for admissibility of the polygraph test stated:
" ... a stipulation does not in any way establish the
reliability or accuracy of polygraph test results.
However, it does embody an important notion of fairness for those parties who consider the polygraph
reliable and are willing to rely on it. A stipulation
forecloses one party from preventing admission of an
adverse test after he and the opposing party have agreed
it would be admissible, simply because he does not like
the results.
In addition, a stipulation allows each
of the parties to insist that the polygraph be administered by reputable, qualified persons, in a manner most
conducive to producing accurate results, and in a manner
that can be monitored."
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In the Abel case, supra, speaking of the accuracy of
the polygraph, the Court stated:
"This Court has heretofore observed that even its
most sanguine proponents admit that it cannot be
relied on to determine with absolute and invariable
assurance whether a person is lying or telling the
truth.
State vs. Jenkins, Utah, 523 P.2d 1232(1974)"
The Abel case, supra, stands for the proposition that the
stipulation to introduce the polygraph results into evidence, must
be binding on both sides.

In the Abel case, supra, the defendant

had signed the stipulation, but the counsel for the State of Utah
had not signed the stipulation.

The Court said there is no stip-

ulation because only the defendant is bound by the agreement and held
that the Court by allowing the test results into evidence had
committed error.
In the case at bar, now being considered by the Court,
there is no claim that there was a stipulation for the admission
of the polygraph test results.

There was the erroneous representa-

tion that the defendant's insurance company representative had
requested such a test but the plaintiff, Ben Miller, specifically
testified that was not so.

R-277 and R-280 lines 20 to 30.

If the rule for the admission of polygraph test results
is that there must be a binding stipulation, a foundation by the
operator as to his qualifications, and a showing that the test was
conducted according to accepted principles; it would then seem
logical that the alleged results of the test could not be introduced

by the statement of a witness that he had taken a test and the
evidence that he was giving was truthful.
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The California District Court of Appeal, Second District,
in

PE~ople

vs. Aragon, 316 P.2d 370, in analyzing a case similar to

the one at bar, stated:
'.'In the instant case there is nothing before us to
establish what kind of lie detector test was given,
if any; there is nothing concerning the accuracy of
such a test; there is no showing that the tests, even
if properly given, have achieved scientific recognition in this state; there is no foundation for the
admission of any test results; and there is no stipulation that the testimony could be received in evidence.
It is not at all unlikely that a popular belief has
been formed from press, radio, television, stage and
screen that the lie detector is an accomplishment of
modern science the results of which are as reliable
as those of fingerprinting, blood tests and ballistics.
However this is not correct.
It is general knowledge
among those familiar with the lie detector machines
that the results are greatly dependent upon the training, experience and skill of the operators and that
the results vary with different types of subjects .
. .. Appellate court reports throughout the country
would indicate an agreement that the best lie detector
test to date is a thorough painstaking and searching
cross-examination by competent counsel.
If the result of the lie detector test is inadmissible in the first instance, surely no one would contend
that the results can be cloaked in the raiment of an
accusatory statement and then slipped into evidence.
If
we were to hold that such a course is proper we would
have sanctioned the receipt of damaging evidence which,
but for such masking, could not be heard by the jury.
We believe that the prosecution should not be permitted
to introduce into evidence by indirection what wduld be
highly improper if done directly.
Our system of jurisprudence is not constructed upon such a foundation.
Moreover, it would be hard to believe that the jury here considered the statements solely as accusatory statements.
Obviously the statements with reference to the lie
detector test as introduced in this case were highly
prejudicial and in our opinion constituted prejudicial
error.''
The calling of the first rebuttal witness, a Steven Taylor,
who purportedly had conducted a polygraph test on Ben Miller after
the connnencernent of the trial at bar; the statement by Mr. Thurber
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that the next witness would be another certified polygraph operator,
Steve Bartlett, who was out of the state and not available; and the
recalling of Ben Miller to state again that he had not lied to anyone about what happened as it related to the accident; constituted
further prejudicial error.
The Utah Supreme Court adopted Rules of Evidence, February
I

17, 1971, which were effective July 1, 1971.

Rule 2, provides as

follows:
"Except to the extent to which they may be relaxed
by other procedural rule or statute applicable
to the specific situation, these rules shall apply
in every proceeding, both criminal and civil, conducted by or under the supervision of a court, in
which evidence is produced."
Defendant in the case before the bar contends in civil
matters there is no procedural rule or statute applicable to the
specific situation of the admissibility of the results of the lie
detector test that should make the rule different in civil and
in criminal cases.
Other Courts have dealt with the matter of lie detector
tests in civil cases.
The California Court in 1957 laid down the hard and fast
rule:
"Lie detector tests have no place in California law."
Gideon vs. Gideon, 314 P.2d 1011.
The Montana Court in 1972, stated:
" ... Few jurisdictions allow the polygraph tests in
criminal actions.
An extensive research reveals
fewer jurisdictions have considered such evidence
in civil actions.
After hearing the evidence offered
by the polygraph expert at the trial, the court
properly excluded his testimony."
Gropp vs. Lotton, 503 P.2d 661, at 666.
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The New Mexico Court in 1966, stated:
"That Legislature by statute saw fit to license
and regulate polygraphy did not raise profession
or occupation to such scientific dignity as would
justify Supreme Court's recognition of results of
polygraph tests as admissible evidence."
In re Moyer, 421 P.2d 781.
However, by 1976, the New Mexico Court had modified
its rule in civil cases to the point where the Court stated:
"present standard for admissibility of polygraph
evidence takes into consideration qualifications
of polygraph operator, reliability of procedure
used, validity of test made, and other evidentiary
requirements." Hammond vs. Reeves, 552 P.2d 1237,
at 1238.
All of the Courts seem to require that before polygraph
test results will be admissible in evidence, a foundation must be
laid that the examiner is qualified and the examination was conducted according to accepted principles.

The case at bar falls

short of even the very minimum standard.
In the interest of uniformity it would seem that both
in civil and in criminal matters, under the Rules of Evidence for
Utah and the Collins case, supra, a further prerequisite should
require stipulation between the parties.
POINT II

THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY AS TO WHAT EFFECT
THEIR ANSWERS WOULD HAVE ON THE FINAL OUTCOME OF THE CASE.
The court committed error in instructing the Jury as to
what effect their answers would have on the final outcome of the case.
Over the objection of defendant's counsel, the court instruct
the Jury as follows in Instruction No. 10.
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"In considering your answer to Question No. f,
the Court cautions you that the amounts you arrive
at are not necessarily the amounts plaintiff Ben
Miller will be awarded as a judgment against the
defendant. The Court may be required to make certain
adjustments to your findings by reason of the comparative negligence law of this State.
Under that law plaintiff Ben Miller will not ultimately be awarded judgment for any amount, regardless
of your answers, if you find his negligence equal to
or greater than that of the defendant. On the other
hand, if you find the defendant's negligence greater
than plaintiff Miller's negligence, then plaintiff
Miller will ultimately be awarded a judgment, but in
awarding judgment to him the Court will reduce your
figures in answer to Question No. 4 by the percentage
of negligence which you have attributed to him if any,
in your answer to Question No. 3.
With respect to plaintiff Jovalle Thomas, the Court
will ultimately award judgment to her against the
defendant for the full amount stated in your answer
to Question No. 5, without reduction, as she is not
affected by the comparative negligence law."
In Comparative Negligence Manuel, by Carroll R. Heft, J.D ..
and C. James Heft, J.D., published by Callaghan &-Company, 1971, it
states:
"The special verdict is the very cornerstone of the
comparative negligence concept, and the jury does not,
and should not, know the legal effect and result of
its answers to the interrogatoreis in the special verdict. By using the procedure of a special verdict under
comparative negligence, a jury finds the facts without
regard to the ultimate outcome of the case. The court
takes the facts as found by the jury and awards judgment.
The procedure is intended to ascertain the truth untainted by prejudice or a desire to see one of the parties
win or lose." (Chapter 8, page 1.)
In 1974, the Utah Supreme Court, in the case of McGinn
vs. Utah Power & Light Company, 529 P.2d 423, ruling upon a comparative negligence case that arose under the laws of the State of Idaho
construing Idaho law, held that the jury should not be informed as
to the effect of their verdict on the final outcome of the case .
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Judge Henroid, speaking for the Utah Court, stated:
"The general rule is that it is reversible error
for the trial court to instruct the jury as to what
effect their answers will have on the final outcome
of the case."
While Utah law was not in issue, Judge Henroid said the Court
chose to subscribe to the rule as above announced.
Counsel for defense urges that the above is a good and
proper rule and should be the law 0f this case.
CONCLUSION
The results of polygraph examinations may be admitted
under binding stipulation between the parties, but even if there
is stipulation, admissibility must be premised upon proof that the
examiner was qualified and that the examination was conducted accord
ing to accepted principles.
The court committed prejudicial error in the case at bar
in failing to grant defendant McMullen's motion for a mistrial when
plaintiff, Ben Miller, as the first witness, testified that he had
taken a lie detector test that verified what he was testifying to
was the truth.
Plaintiff's counsel laid a foundation for the court's
prejudicial error when he made the erroneous representation that
the defendant's insurance company representative had requested the
polygraph test.
The prejudicial error was further compounded by the statement of Mr. Thurber that the next witness would be another certified
polygraph operator, Steve Bartlett, who was out of the state and not
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available; and the recalling of Ben Miller to state again that
he had not lied to anyone about what happened as it related to
the accident.
The court committed prejudicial error in instructing
the jury as to what effect their answers to the special verdict
would have on the final outcome of the case.
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